Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law
Volume 6 | Issue 1

Article 8

3-1-1992

Legitimate Exercise of Parens Patriae Doctrine:
State Power to Determine an Incompetent
Individual's "Right to Die" After Cruzan ex rel.
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health
Carl Hernandez III

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl
Part of the Medical Jurisprudence Commons
Recommended Citation
Carl Hernandez III, Legitimate Exercise of Parens Patriae Doctrine: State Power to Determine an Incompetent Individual's "Right to Die"
After Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 6 BYU J. Pub. L. 167 (1992).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol6/iss1/8

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young
University Journal of Public Law by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Legitimate Exercise of Parens Patriae Doctrine:
State Power to Determine an Incompetent
Individual's "Right to Die" After Cruzan ex rel.
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department
of Health 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most perplexing issues ever to reach the attention of judges, legislators, and the American public is that of
determining a person's so-called "right to die." 2 In Cruzan ex
rel. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the
Supreme Court held that a state may maintain an "unqualified
interest"3 in the preservation of life and may exercise substantial power in determining an incompetent individual's right to
die. 4 This note will demonstrate that the Court's decision in
Cruzan correctly promotes a legitimate state interest in protecting life while, at the same time, safeguarding the rights of
an incompetent person's wishes, stated while competent, not to
have her life prolonged by life-sustaining treatment.
Because the decision turned on an inherently philosophical
principle5-when life ends and who may determine when it

1.
110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
2.
The first in this line of cases was In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 992 (1976). For a discussion of Quinlan, see infra notes 3538 and accompanying text.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2853.
3.
4.
Including the Cruzan case, 22 states have addressed the issue and "no national consensus has yet emerged on the best solution for this difficult and sensitive problem." Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2859 (O'Connor J., concurring). For a listing
of state courts addressing the issue, see Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760
S.W.2d 408, 412 n.12 (Mo. 1988) (en bane), affd sub nom. Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990). See also In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617
(Nev. 1990); In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 (Ill. 1989).
5.
As Justice Stevens suggested, an interest in preserving life may be made
on "the basis of theological or philosophical conjecture." Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2888
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also commented that the "constitutional
significance of death is difficult to describe" and that "not much may be said with
confidence about death unless it is said from faith." !d. at 2885. Concerning the
individual's right to choose when he will die, Justice Stevens stated: "Many philosophies and religions have, for example, long venerated the idea that there is a 'life
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may be properly terminated-the Court's five-to-four decision
in Cruzan reflects the diverse viewpoints which may be argued
in favor of or against an incompetent person's so-called "right
to die." Cruzan sheds new light on this difficult issue and is
significant because the Court relies on an unprecedented fourteenth amendment analysis in deciding the issues. Based on
this fourteenth amendment analysis, Cruzan gives individual
states broad leeway to develop both substantive and procedural
rules of law concerning an incompetent individual's right to
die. 6
This note seeks to demonstrate that Cruzan is a correct
decision by discussing the Court's apparent rejection of previous "right to die" decisions based on common law doctrines and
on a federal constitutional right to privacy. Most importantly,
the Court has implicitly promoted the doctrine of parens patriae,7 thereby giving states more power to determine the confmes of an incompetent individual's right to die. A state may exercise this parens patriae power by affording incompetent individuals a right to die based on a state constitutional right to privacy or state judicial proceedings consistent with notions of
substantive and procedural due process of law. 8

after death,' and that the human soul endures even after the human body has
perished. Surely Missouri would not wish to define its interest in life in a way
antithetical to this tradition." ld. n.15; see also Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life
and Death, 102 HARV. L. REV. 375 (1988).
Justice O'Connor made this evident when she stated: "Today we decide only
6.
that one State's practice does not violate the Constitution; the more challenging
task of crafting appropriate procedures for safeguarding incompetents' liberty
interests is entrusted to the 'laboratory' of the States . . . ." Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at
2859 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
The term parens patriae referred to the common law power of the King to
7.
act as guardian for infants and others who were unable to make competent decisions. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979). "The words 'parens patriae,'
meaning 'father of the country,' refer to a state's sovereign power of guardianship
over minors and other persons under disability." Wentzel v. Montgomery General
Hosp., 447 A.2d 1244, 1253 (Md. 1982).
8.
After summarizing the present state of the law concerning an incompetent
person's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, the Court stated:
As these cases demonstrate, the common-law doctrine of informed consent is viewed as generally encompassing the right of a competent individual to refuse medical treatment. Beyond that, these decisions demonstrate both similarity and diversity in their approach to decision of what
all agree is a perplexing question with unusually strong moral and ethical
overtones. State courts have available to them for decision a number of
sources-state constitutions, statutes, and common law-which are not

167]

PARENS PATRIAE DOCTRINE

169

II. THE Cruzan CASE
Nancy Cruzan was rendered incompetent due to serious
injuries sustained in an automobile accident in 1983. Nearly
nine years after the accident, 9 Nancy remained in a Missouri
State hospital in a "persistent vegetative state." 10 Mter concluding that Nancy's chances for recovery were virtually nonexistent, her parents asked hospital personnel to terminate
artificial nutrition and hydration mechanisms which served to
keep Nancy alive. Termination of the support systems would
"cause" Nancy to die. 11
Mter the request was denied, the Cruzans sought and received a court order authorizing termination of their daughter's
life support system. The basis of the state trial court's decision
turned on Nancy's expressed intent that her life not be sustained by artificial means. The trial court stated:
Nancy's 'expressed thoughts at age twenty-five in somewhat
serious conversation with a house-mate friend that if sick or
injured she would not wish to continue her life unless she
could live at least halfway normally suggests [sic] that given
her present condition she would not wish to continue on with
her nutrition and hydration.' 12

available to us.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851.
9.
Recently, Nancy's parents were allowed to have Nancy's treatment removed.
Nancy died 12 days after nutrition and hydration mechanisms were disconnected
from her body. See Father Wins Ruling on Right to Die, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1991,
§ A, at 16, col. 4.
10.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2845. The Court described this medical term as "a
condition in which a person exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indications of
significant cognitive function." ld. Dr. Fred Plum, the originator of the term,
described it in this manner:
"Vegetative state describes a body which is functioning entirely in terms
of its internal controls. It maintains temperature. It maintains heart beat
and pulmonary ventilation. It maintains digestive activity. It maintains
reflex activity of muscles and nerves for low level conditioned responses.
But there is no behavioral evidence of either self-awareness or of awareness of the surroundings in a learned manner."
ld. n.1 (quoting In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 438 (N.J. 1987).
11.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2846. In times past, the natural process of dying
prevented such difficult issues from arising. However, with the advent of new
technology, a balance between the right of the government (acting on behalf of the
people) in asserting an interest in the preservation of life and the rights of incompetent individuals must be met.
12.
!d. (quoting App. Pet. for Cert. A97-A98).
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The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the lower court's
decision-which would have allowed Nancy Cruzan's parents to
remove the life-sustaining treatment-by rejecting the common
law theory of substitute judgment as applied to an incompetent
individual's decision to refuse life-sustaining treatment. 13
The Missouri Supreme Court also rejected the notion that
Nancy could refuse life-sustaining treatment by exercising the
common law doctrine of informed consenti 4 on her own behalf.
Thus, the court held that an incompetent person's right to
removal of life sustaining treatment could only be exercised by
meeting the proper formalities of the Missouri living will statute or by demonstrating the incompetent's previously stated
desire by a showing of "clear, and convincing, inherently reliable evidence." 15 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to hear the case. 16
One issue before the Supreme Court in Cruzan was whether Nancy Cruzan had a federal constitutional right requiring
the hospital to remove the life-sustaining treatmentY The
Court held that Nancy Cruzan had no federal constitutional
right to privacy in having the nutrition and hydration treatment removed. 18 An equally important issue was whether the
United States Constitution forbids Missouri's requirement that
an incompetent's desire to have life-sustaining equipment removed be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 19 In answering this question, the Court stated that "Missouri may
legitimately seek to safeguard the personal element of the
choice between life and death through the imposition of height-

13.
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 424-26. For a discussion of the substitute
judgment theory, see infra text accompanying note 26.
14.
ld. at 416-17. For a discussion of the doctrine of informed consent, see
infra text accompanying note 25.
ld. at 425. Although the court presented these two tests, it avoided giving
15.
any explanation as to what may constitute "inherently reliable evidence." Id.
Plausible suggestions on how the latter test may be met are discussed infra
section V.D.2 of this note. Although the Court stated that the Missouri living will
statute was not at issue in the case, it relied upon the statute's clear policy in
favor of preserving life. ld. at 420. For discussion of Missouri's living will statute,
see infra notes 72-85 and accompanying text.
16.
Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 109 S. Ct.
3240 (1989).
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2846.
17.
ld. at 2851 n.7.
18.
19.
ld. at 2852.
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ened evidentiary requirements."20 However, the question still
remains: how may a state exercise this power as parens patriae
for the incompetent individual in "right to die" cases?
III.

AN INCOMPETENT INDIVIDUAL'S "RIGHT TO DIE"
PRIOR TO

Cruzan

Prior to Cruzan, an incompetent person's right to die was
founded in common law, 21 in state and federal constitutions,22 and in state statutes. 23 Arguably, only a state constitutional right to privacy has supported the state's interest in
the preservation of life while at the same time protecting the
incompetent person's interests in "right to die" cases. 24 The
common law and the statutory "right to die," in many instances, did not adequately recognize the state's interest in the preservation of life nor the incompetent individual's choice to remove or retain life-sustaining treatment in "right to die" cases.

A. The Common Law Right
Most courts basing an incompetent person's right to die in
the common law have done so with reference to the doctrines of
informed consent25 and substitute judgment.26 An incompe20.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852-53. The Court supported Missouri's imposition of
a clear and convincing standard of evidence, which also arguably promotes a
balancing of state and individual interests, by stating that this standard of proof
was appropriate because:
The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the
Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to "instruct the
factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should
have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of
adjudication."
Id. at 2853 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)).
See, e.g., In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. App. Div.), cert. denied, 454
21.
U.S. 858 (1981); In re Lydia E. Hall Hosp., 455 N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. App. Div.
1982); In re Welfare of Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983).
For a list of representative cases, see Cruzan u. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408,
22.
417 n.12 (Mo. 1988) (en bane).
See, e.g., Conservatorship of Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Cal. Ct. App.
23.
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1024 (1989); In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d
292 (Ill. 1989); In re Conservatorship of Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984).
24.
For discussion of an incompetent individual's right to die under a state constitutional right to privacy, see infra section V.C of this note.
See, e.g., In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 (Ill. 1989). In order for
25.
a person to give informed consent to medical treatment, it is generally recognized
that:
"[T]he patient must have the capacity to reason and make judgments, the
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tent person's right to refuse medical treatment based on the
common law doctrine of informed consent was first recognized
by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz. 27 There, a severely mentally-retarded resident of a state school was in need
of chemotherapy but incapable of giving informed consent to
receive treatment. 28 The court reasoned that since a competent individual could refuse life-sustaining treatment based on
the doctrine of informed consent, an incompetent person could
also exercise that same right. 29 Although the right to informed
consent was maintained in the incompetent person, the court
recognized that the state interest in the preservation of life was
substantial. 30 However, the court failed to offer a complete
analysis in balancing the state's interest in the preservation of
life with the incompetent's right to have previously stated
wishes carried forth.
In Cruzan v. Harmon, the court expressly disavowed the
notion that Nancy Cruzan could make an informed decision to
refuse to have her life-sustaining treatment removed, stating
that "it is definitionally impossible for a person to make an
informed decision-either to consent or to refuse [medical
treatment]-under hypothetical circumstances."31 Moreover,
decision must be made voluntarily and without coercion, and the patient
must have a clear understanding of the risks and benefits of the proposed
treatment alternatives or non treatment, along with a full understanding
of the nature of the disease and the prognosis."
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 417 (quoting Wanzer, Adelstein, Cranford,
Federman, Hook, Moertel, Safar, Stone, Taussig & Van Eys, The Physicians's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED., 955, 957
(1984)).
26.
See, e.g., Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986).
Under the substitute judgment theory, another person, such as a close family
member is allowed to make a decision to retain or remove an incompetent's lifesustaining treatment. The substitute judgment theory, however, creates problems
when another individual is allowed to exercise his unilateral judgment on the
incompetent's behalf, neglecting virtually any interest a state may have in the matter.
27.
370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977). Although the doctrine of informed consent as
applied to an incompetent person's right to refuse treatment was a novel application in Saikewicz, the doctrine is well established in cases where a person is competent to exercise the right. See, e.g., Marjorie M. Shultz, Informed Choice to
Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219 (1985).
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 427.
28.
29.
Id.
30.
Id. at 426.
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 417. It can be inferred from this
31.
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the court rejected the substitute judgment theory as applied to
an incompetent's choice by stating that the theory allows "the
decisionmaker to assume that he is an incompetent who becomes competent but continues to weigh the decision as though
incompetent."32
Recognizing that both state and individual interests may
not be properly balanced when the common law doctrines of
informed consent and substitute judgment are applied, the
Cruzan Court limited the application of these doctrines by
stating:
The difficulty with petitioner's claim is that in a sense it begs
the question: an incompetent person is not able to make an
informed and voluntary choice to exercise a hypothetical right
to refuse treatment or any other right. Such "right" must be
exercised, if at all, by some sort of surrogate. 33

Thus, by limiting the informed consent and substitute judgment doctrines relied on in Saikewicz and by other courts, the
Court announced that the State of Missouri could require a
surrogate decision-maker to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the incompetent person would have refused
the use of life-support systems. 34
statement that the court referred to Nancy's Cruzan's actual ability to make an informed decision about the treatment she was receiving after she became incompetent. The court probably reached this decision because prior statements made by
Nancy could not provide enough evidence to show that the necessary elements of
an informed decision were fulfilled. For a discussion of the informed consent criteria, see supra text accompanying note 25.
32.
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 425 n.20. For a definition of the substitute judgment theory, see supra text accompanying note 26.
33.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852 (emphasis added). The Court also seems to
reject the substitute judgment standard by stating:
If the State were required by the United States Constitution to repose a
right of substituted judgment with anyone, the Cruzans would surely
qualify. But we do not think the Due Process Clause requires the State
to repose judgment on these matters with anyone but the patient herself.
Close family members may have a strong feeling-a feeling not at all
ignoble or unworthy, but not entirely disinterested, either-that they do
not wish to witness the continuation of the life of a loved one which they
regard as hopeless, meaningless, and even degrading. But there is no
automatic assurance that the view of close family members will necessarily be the same as the patient's would have been had she been confronted with the prospect of her situation while competent.
ld. at 2855-56.
34.
ld. Requiring a standard of clear and convincing evidence allows for the
avoidance of inherently problematic issues arising from reliance on purely common
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The Constitutional Right

The landmark decision in In re Quinlan 35 was the first
time a court was faced with the issue of whether an incompetent person in a vegetative state is entitled to the removal of a
life support system. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that
Karen Quinlan had a federal constitutional right to privacy to
have the respirator, which kept her alive, removed. 36 Most
courts following this decision have deviated little from its holding.37 However, the court in Quinlan also recognized that the
right to privacy in refusing life-sustaining treatment was not
an absolute right and must properly yield to state interests in
some circumstances. 38 As is the case in common law "right to
die" analysis, state interests are often neglected by analyzing
an incompetent's right to die under a federal constitutional
right to privacy. As the court in Cruzan v. Harrrwn stated:
In casting the balance between the patient's common law
right to refuse treatment/constitutional right to privacy and
the state's interest in life, we acknowledge that the great
majority of courts allow the termination of life-sustaining
treatment. In doing so, these courts invariably find that a
patient's right to refuse treatment outweighs the state's interest in preserving life. 39

law theories. Dependence on outdated common law theories when dealing with
difficult social policy issues, such as the one presented in Cruzan, can only serve
to abate the rights of the incompetent individual and of the state. In these types
of cases, a preponderance of the evidence will simply not suffice. See, e.g., Tracy L.
Merritt, Note, Equality {or the Elderly Incompetent: A Proposal for Dignified Death,
39 STAN. L. REV. 689, 714 (1987) (arguing that the substitute judgment theory
cannot be used to promote an incompetent's autonomy without reliable evidence of
the incompetent's intent).
35.
355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
36.
355 A.2d at 662-64.
37.
See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370
N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977), stating:
The constitutional right to privacy, as we conceive it, is an expression of
the sanctity of individual free choice and self determination as fundamental constituents of life. The value of life as so perceived is lessened not
by a decision to refuse treatment, but by the failure to allow a competent
being the right of choice.
lei. at 426 (emphasis added); see also Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297,
304 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
38.
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664.
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 420 (emphasis added). The Missouri
39.
Supreme Court also stated that the root of this apparent problem is the Quinlan
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Recognizing a need to foster development of state laws concerning an incompetent's right to die-and the subsequent opportunity for a state to protect its interests while at the same time
protecting the incompetent's interests-the Cruzan Court refused to base its analysis on a federal constitutional right to
privacy. 40 Although there is no federal constitutional right to
privacy in "right to die" cases, a state remains free to extend
such a right based on its own constitution. 41

C.The Statutory Right
Due to the complex issues involved in deciding whether an
incompetent person has the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, a number of states have enacted "living will" legislation
with the intent to allow persons to expressly state whether
they would refuse life-sustaining treatment in the event they
become incompetent at some future time. 42 Additionally, some

decision. ld. at 421.
40.
The Court stated that "[a]lthough many state courts have held that a right
to refuse treatment is encompassed by a generalized constitutional right of privacy,
we have never so held. We believe this issue is more properly analyzed in terms of
a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest." Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851 n.7. For a
discussion of the liberty interest, see infra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
Perhaps the Court's rejection of the federal constitutional right to privacy as
applied to an incompetent person's right to die stems from the legal controversies
resulting from its expanded reading of the federal constitutional right to privacy in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Indeed, Justice Scalia stated:
I am concerned, from the tenor of today's opinions, that we are poised to
confuse that enterprise as successfully as we have confused the enterprise
of legislation concerning abortion-requiring it to be conducted against a
background of federal constitutional imperatives that are unknown because they are being newly crafted from Term to Term. That would be a
great misfortune.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2859 (Scalia, J., concurring). The Court "has cautioned
against an expansive interpretation of privacy rights." Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp.
580, 584 (D.R.I. 1988). The Court has also stated that "[c]ourts are most venerable
and [come] nearest to illegitimacy when . . . [working] with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable language or design of the Constitution."
Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 584 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986)).
For a discussion of this theory, see infra section V.C.
41.
42.
Thirty-eight states and the District of Colombia have enacted "living will"
statutes. See ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -8A-10 (1990); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010 to
.100 (1986); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3210 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§
20-17-101 to -203 (Supp. 1989); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1785-1795 (West
Supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (Supp. 1990); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-570 to -575 (West Supp. 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§
2501-2508 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2401 to -2430 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
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states have durable power of attorney statutes 43 which expressly authorize the appointment of health care proxies to
make medical decisions for incompetent persons. 44 Still, other
living will statutes specifically authorize an individual to designate health care proxies who may assure that the intent of the
living will is effectuated. 45 When properly followed, living will
statutes allow an individual to forego life-sustaining treatment
in the event the individual becomes incompetent to make such

765.01 to .15 (West Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -32-12 (Supp. 1990);
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to -27 (Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4509
(Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 112, para. 701-710; (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 to -11-22 (Burns 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1 to
.11 (West 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101 to -28,109 (1985); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 40;1299.58.1 to 58.10 (West Supp. 1991); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§
5-601 to -614 (Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145B.01 to .17 (1990); MISS. CODE
ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010 to .055 (Vernon
1991); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-501 to -511 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 459.540 to
.690 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1 to -H:16 (1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
24-7-1 to -7-10 (1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -322 (West Supp. 1991); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.4-01 to .4-14 (1989) OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111
(West Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.605 to .650 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. §§
44-77-10 to -160 (Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -110 (Supp. 1990);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (1987), VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 18, §§ 52515262 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2992 (Supp. 1990) WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 70.122.010 to .122.905 (West Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10
(1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01 to .15 (West 1989); WYO. STAT. §§ 35-22-101 to 109 (1987).
Every state, as well as the District of Columbia, has a general power of
43.
attorney statute. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2858 n. 3 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing
statutes). A general power of attorney statute allows a person (principal) to confer
authority upon another to act on behalf of the principal "notwithstanding later
disability or incapacity of the principal at law . . . ." UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-501
(1987). The power must be conferred in writing. ld. The power may be revoked
either orally or in writing. ld. Theoretically, the general power of attorney statute
may be used to delegate medical decisions prior to the advent of future incapacity.
This method, however, has essentially the same pitfalls which exist with living will
statutes. For a discussion of these problems, see infra notes 52-69 and accompanying text.
44.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2857 n.2 (O'Conner, J., concurring) (citing statutes).
Durable power of attorney statutes, in this author's opinion, do not substantially
forward the interests of the state in solving the "right to die" issue. This is because most statutes require that durable power of attorney documents comport substantially with the provisions and examples set forth in the statute. See, e.g., MISS.
STAT. ANN. § 41-41-63 (Supp. 1990). Thus, it seems that most people would have
to consult an attorney to draft the document, a requirement which is not practical
for thousands of this country's citizens. Moreover, since few people know that such
statutes exist, see Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring), it is unlikely that they will rely on drafting such documents required in durable power of
attorney statutes.
45.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2858 n.4 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing statutes).
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a decision.
The living will is much more rigidly confined than the
ordinary will, and correctly so, because in "right to die" cases
the "individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both
'particularly important' and 'more substantial than mere loss of
money.'"46 Generally speaking, traditional wills usually require that the testator be at least eighteen years of age and be
of "sound mind,"47 and that the will be in writing and signed
by the testator or in the testator's name by another in the
testator's presence. 48 Additionally, two other witnesses generally must sign the will. In comparison, all living will statutes
require witnesses, but not all statutes require the witnesses to
sign in the presence of each other. 49 Also, all living will statutes require that the declarant be a competent adult. 50 In addition, a number of limitations are usually placed on those who
are allowed to serve as witnesses in the creation of the living
will. 51 These limitations are often nullified by other conflicting
sections within the same statute. Such conflict compels the
argument that judicial involvement is warranted in "right to
die" cases, even where a living will is involved.

1. Problems with current legislation
Although an in-depth discussion of problems relating to
living will statutes and other legislation is beyond the scope of
this note, 52 discussion of a few examples will help in showing
that current statutes may be as problematic as common law
theories because, in many instances, they allow for unilateral
decision-making by family members and doctors-a decision
process implicitly rejected in Cruzan. 53
A common problem with all living will statutes is that they
seem to extend to a person desiring to execute the will an absolute right to have its mandates set in motion. The living will is

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

ld. at 2853 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982).
See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-501 (1978).
ld. at § 75-2-502.
Id.
See Gregory Gelfand, Living Will Statutes: The First Decade, 1987 WIS. L.
REV. 737, 757.
51.
See infra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
52.
For an in depth discussion of problems encountered in living will statutes,
see Gelfand, supra note 50, at 737.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2855-56.
53.
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deceiving in this manner since "[l]iving wills were not intended
to solve every problem associated with the dying process. Accordingly, living will statutes often contain limitations on the
scope and significance of the authority to execute such a document."54 The limitations are often inadequate, and, as the following examples will show, sole reliance on legislation in deciding an incompetent person's right to die is inappropriate.
Concerning the execution of the living will, many states
provide that a witness to the will cannot be related to the declarant.55 Neither may a witness be an attending physician, 56
a person financially responsible for a declarant's medical
care, 57 an employee of the attending physician or an employee
of the institution where the declarant is receiving treatment, 58
or someone who expects to inherit from the declarant. 59 These
limitations apparently are placed in living will statutes to avoid
conflicts of interest. However, many times these limitations are
nullified by the fact that most statutes ultimately allow a close
family member to make the decision to remove life-sustaining
treatment from an incompetent, 60 and this decision is usually
based heavily on the diagnosis of the attending physician. 61

54.
Gelfand, supra note 50, at 783.
55.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4 (1990) (providing that a witness cannot be
"related to the declarant by blood or marriage").
See, e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-105 (Supp. 1990) (providing that no
56.
witness may be "the attending physician or any other physician").
See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2422 (a)(4)(A) (1989) (stating witness may not
57.
be a person "directly financially responsible for declarant's medical care").
58.
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030 (Supp. 1990).
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3202(A)(2), (3) (1985).
59.
60.
Allowing an incompetent person's purported wishes to be fulfilled by a close
family member is even more dangerous, from a conflict of interest perspective,
than allowing a relative to take part in the signing of a living will. Logically
speaking, it makes little sense to grant family members unilateral rights to make
a decision for an incompetent person where a family member should be allowed little or no participation in the creation of a living will. Accordingly, the state as
parens patriae should play a significant role in assuring that the incompetent
person's wishes are rightfully carried forth. See infra section V of this note.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-571 (West Supp. 1990) providing:
61.
(1) The decision to remove such life support system is based on the best
medical judgment of the attending physician; (2) the attending physician
deems the patient to be in a terminal condition; (3) the attending physician has obtained the informed consent of the next of kin, if known, or
legal guardian, if any, of the patient prior to removal; and (4) the attending physician has considered the patient's wishes as expressed by the
patient directly through the next of kin, or legal guardian.
The validity of such provisions is highly questionable after Cruzan's apparent
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Some states which authorize the use of living wills do not
prohibit those who might inherit and those who have other
claims against the estate from becoming witnesses. 62 This is
very disturbing since there may be an even higher possibility
that such a witness will not act in the incompetent's best interest. As the court in John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital, Inc. v.
Bludworth 63 commented: "One need not go so far back in history as Cain and Abel to recognize that the interests of various
family members are not always synonymous or even harmonious. The newspaper is a daily reminder that murderers are
often related to their victims."64 Thus, the need for a balanced
approach in deciding such difficult issues as those presented in
Cruzan becomes apparent because evidence of an incompetent's
purported desire to have life-sustaining treatment removed
may only exist in those who may know the declarant most
intimately: most likely this will be the incompetent's close
family members. 65
However, the most disturbing point regarding the living
will and other similar legislation is that the vast majority of
the public does not or cannot employ the use of a living will. 66
Some people fail to plan for the need of the documents and
others do not know that such documents exist. 67 Additionally,
some persons are born incompetent and obviously cannot execute a living will. 68 Assuming that a person will execute his
own living will neglects the fact that relatively few people understand the confines of the will, its purposes, and its necessity. At least two states have recognized the difficulties posed in
relying on living will statutes to solve all "right to die" issues.
Both Maine and Texas repealed their respective living will

rejection of the substitute judgment theory and its reliance on due process analysis
allowing for a balancing of state and individual interests. In light of Cruzan, it
would seem that such reliance on physician and family decisions must be subject
to judicial review before life-sustaining treatment may be allowed.
62.
See Gelfand, supra note 50, at 758 n.77.
63.
432 So. 2d. 611 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd, 452 So. 2d. 921 (Fla.
1984).
64.
ld. at 618.
65.
See Gelfand, supra note 50, at 758.
66.
Justice O'Connor cites one survey in which only 15% of those surveyed utilized a living will statute declaring their wishes concerning the use of life-sustaining treatment in the event they become incompetent to make such decisions.
Cruzan, llO S. Ct. at 2R57 n.l. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
67.
Gelfand, supra note 50, at 787.
68.
ld.

180

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 6

statutes in 1989. 69
Despite the problems found in various living will statutes,
what really must be balanced is the right of the declarant to
avoid life-sustaining treatment, the state's interest in the preservation of life, and the state's interest as parens patriae in
protecting the incompetent from others who may make a decision contrary to her true desire. 70 Such a balance may exist in
allowing guardians to represent the state as parens patriae for
the incompetent individual and allowing the courts, also as
parens patriae for the incompetent, to determine whether execution of the will is in the best interest of the incompetent.
Because Cruzan has implicitly allowed for a limitation on the
substitute judgment theory, some living will statutes may need
modification to create procedural processes which will more
equally balance state and individual interests in determining
an incompetent's right to die. Such modification would create
an avenue by which the role of the courts, as parens patriae for
the incompetent, may be significantly expanded. 71

2.

Missouri's living will statute in the Cruzan case

The Missouri Life Support Declarations Act 72 is similar to
an ordinary will in respect to making a declaration. 73 The act
permits a declarant to decide whether a "death-prolonging
procedure" is to be maintained. 74 The declaration provides
that if a person "should have a terminal condition," her intent
to have life-prolonging treatment withheld may be honored.
The "terminal condition" definition of the statute, however, is
extremely narrow. The definition provides that a terminal condition is "an incurable or irreversible condition, which in the
opinion of the attending physician, is such that death will occur
within a short time regardless of the application of medical

69.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2921-2931, repealed by Laws 1989, § 0.830
(Supp. 1990); TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h, repealed by Acts 1989, 71st
leg., ch. 678, § 13(1) (eff. Sept. 1, 1989) (Supp. 1991).
70.
The Court in Cruzan stated that "'whether respondent's constitutional rights
have been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests against
the relevant state interests.'" Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851-52 (emphasis added)
(quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1988)).
71.
See infra section V of this note.
72.
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010 to .055 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
73.
Mo. STAT. ANN. § 459.015 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
74.
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procedures."15
The Missouri Supreme Court held that Nancy Cruzan's
circumstances did not fall within the statutory definition of
"terminally ill" because "[m]edical experts testified that she
could live another thirty years." 76 Therefore, it is apparent
that the Missouri living will procedure is inapplicable in
Cruzan because Nancy was neither dead 77 nor terminally
ill. 78
Missouri's living will statute provides that a competent
person may explicitly refuse in writing the "administration of
death-prolonging procedures"79 should he at some time become
incompetent. The incompetent's wish is narrowly confined,
however, because the statute's definition of "death-prolonging
procedure"80 does not include "the administration of medication or the performance of medical procedure[s] deemed necessary to provide comfort care or alleviate pain nor the performance of any procedure to provide nutrition or hydration ...."81 Nancy Cruzan's parents' request to have Nancy's
life-sustaining nutrition and hydration removed82 clearly contravened this express provision in Missouri's living will statute
and was, therefore, denied. 83 Moreover, Missouri's living will

75.
Mo. STAT. ANN. § 459.010(5) (Vernon Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
76.
Cruzan v. Harnwn, 760 S.W.2d at 411.
77.
!d. The court quoted language from Missouri's statutory definition of death
as follows:
For all legal purposes, the occurrence of death shall be determined in
accordance with the usual and customary standards of the medical practice, provided that death shall not be determined to have occurred unless
the following minimum conditions have been met:
(1) When respiration and circulation are not artificially maintained,
there is no irreversible cessation of spontaneous respiration and circulation; or
(2) When respiration and circulation are artificially maintained, and
there is total and irreversible cessation of all brain function, including the
brain stem and that such determination is made by a licensed physician.
!d. n.3 (quoting Mo. STAT. ANN. § 194.005 (1986)).
78.
!d. at 411.
79.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.015(3) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
80.
!d.
81.
!d. (emphasis added). Interestingly, the statute's definition of the "deathprolonging" procedure would seem to entirely eviscerate the statute. See Cruzan v.
Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 442 (Welliver, J., dissenting). The statute, however, can be
read as supporting the state of Missouri's "interest in prolongation of the life of
the individual patient and an interest in the sanctity of life itself." !d. at 419.
82.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2846.
83.
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 419-20.
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statute was enacted after Nancy's accident and Nancy had not
executed a living will. 84 Accordingly, Nancy Cruzan could only
have her life-sustaining treatment removed by a showing of
clear and convincing evidence that she so desired while still
competent.
Missouri's living will statute supports the state's strong
interest in the preservation of life. However, adherence to such
a narrowly confined statute may work to deprive an incompetent individual from having her previously stated desires carried forth. One may argue that Missouri's living will statute is
eviscerated by its definition of "death-prolonging procedure,"85
thereby denying an incompetent person any right under the
statute to agree to refuse life-sustaining treatment. This is
troubling since living will statutes must balance both state and
individual interests.
Because Nancy Cruzan was neither technically dead nor
terminally ill under Missouri law, the Missouri Supreme Court
held in Cruzan v. Harmon that the state's interest under the
Missouri living will statute was not in the "quality" of life
which Nancy might maintain but an "unqualified" interest in
the preservation of life. 86 The Supreme Court in Cruzan
agreed with the Missouri Supreme Court, stating that "we
think a State may properly decline to make judgments about
the 'quality' oflife a particular individual may enjoy, and simply assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of human
life to be weighed against the constitutionally protected interests of the individual."87
With this recognition of a state's "unqualified interest in
the preservation of life," a state is more able to properly balance its interest in the preservation of life and the incompetent

84.
!d. at 421. Some living will statutes specifically provide that persons who
have not executed a living will may rely on living will provisions in the event they
become incompetent. See Gelfand, supra note 50, at 787. A relative is then allowed
to give consent for the refusal of or receiving of life sustaining-treatment. !d. A
problem develops in such situations because in essence the statutes allow for
authorization of oral living wills. !d. This approach was implicitly rejected by the
Supreme Court in Cruzan. The Court stated: "It is also worth noting that most, if
not all, States simply forbid oral testimony entirely in determining the wishes of
parties in transactions which, while important, simply do not have the consequences that a decision to terminate a person's life does." Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2854.
See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
85.
86.
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 420.
87.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2853.
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individual's right to refuse or retain life-sustaining treatment
by imposing substantive and procedural processes in "right to
die" cases. 88 These processes are properly founded upon notions of due process. 89 Accordingly, even where living wills
and similar legislation are involved, subsequent decisions involving an incompetent individual's right to die should be subject to judicial scrutiny, and therefore, fit squarely within the
parens patriae power of state courts. 90
IV. Cruzan's APPLICATION OF
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS IN RIGHT TO DIE CASES

The Cruzan decision provides the first instance in which a
court applied a fourteenth amendmene 1 analysis in a "right to
die" case. This approach is significantly different than the federal constitutional right to privacy analysis 92 previously utilized by state courts because it allows a state to assert an interest in the preservation of life without running afoul of the
federal right to privacy. Moreover, the state's interest in the
preservation of life and in protecting the incompetent
individual's rights is more properly balanced against the unilateral decision process of the substitute judgment theory93-a
balancing approach the Supreme Court used by applying its
decision in Youngberg v. Romeo 94 to the facts in Cruzan. 95
The Court in Cruzan explicitly stated that an incompetent
person's right to die "is more properly analyzed in terms of a
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest."96 This "liberty interest" was recently addressed by the Court in Washington v.

88.
!d.
89.
!d.
90.
See infra section V.D of this note.
91.
The fourteenth amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o State
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
92.
See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text. Although the United States
Constitution does not expressly provide a right to privacy, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the right is implicitly provided within the penumbras of the guarantees of the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments to the Constitution.
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (women's right to an abortion).
93.
The court in Cruzan v. Harmon, speaking on the substitute judgment theory stated that "[i]n cases like this one, the doctrine authorizes a guardian to
cause the death of a ward unilaterally." Cruzan v. Harmon 760 S.W.2d at 426.
94.
4.57 U.S. 307 (1982).
95.
See infra section IV.B of this note.
96.
Cruzan, 110 S. CL at 2851 n.7.
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Harper. 97
A. The Harper Liberty Interest
In Harper, the issue before the Court was whether requiring a prison inmate to take anti-psychotic drugs against his
will violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.98 The Court held that the inmate had a substantial liberty interest in refusing treatment, 99 but the state interests involved in this case were adequate to overcome the due process
argument. 100 Therefore, the state's procedural scheme was
found to be an adequate and proper balance of state and individual interests. 101
Although the Court recognized that the "logic" in Harper
was applicable to the Cruzan case, it noted that "the dramatic
consequences involved in refusal of such treatment would inform the inquiry as to whether the deprivation of that interest
is constitutionally permissible."102 The Court therefore recognized that the overwhelming finality of a decision to withhold
life-sustaining treatment from an incompetent is much more
serious than sedating a prison inmate. The Court also recognized that a person in Nancy Cruzan's position may not have a
97.
110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990).
98.
ld. at 1032.
99.
The Court stated that "[ w ]e have no doubt that, in addition to the liberty
interest created by the State's Policy, respondent possesses a significant liberty
interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." ld. at 1036 (citing Youngberg
v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-94 (1980);
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600-01 (1979)).
The state interests involved in Harper included a policy of forced adminis100.
tration of drugs where the inmate "(1) suffers from 'mental disorder' and (2) is
'gravely disabled' or poses a 'likelihood of serious harm' to himself, others, or their
property." Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1033. Interestingly, the Court rejected respondent's
argument that to protect his "liberty interest" "the state must find him incompetent" and seek "court approval of the treatment using a 'substitute judgment'
theory." ld. at 1039.

Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1040. The procedure allowed for a medical profes101.
sional to decide when to medicate rather than a judge. ld. at 1042. The Court held
that "[a] State's attempt to set a high standard for determining when involuntary
medication with antipsychotic drugs is permitted cannot withstand challenge if
there are no procedural safeguards to ensure that the prisoner's interests are taken
into account. Adequate procedures exist here." ld. at 1043. Arguably, no procedural
safeguards exist in most living will statutes or common law theories in "right to
die" cases which will protect state interests.
102.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852.
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"substantial liberty interest" in refusing life-sustaining treatment because an incompetent person cannot make an informed
decision to assert the "liberty interest." 103
Clearly, the Court's discussion of Harper was intended to
show that even if Nancy Cruzan had a "liberty interest" in
refusing life-sustaining treatment, that interest was subject to
a proper balancing of her interest with the State of Missouri's
interest in the preservation of life. The Court stated that "determining that a person has a 'liberty interest' under the Due
Process Clause does not end the inquiry; "whether respondent's
constitutional rights have been violated must be determined by
balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state interests."104

B.

Youngberg's State and Individual Interest Balancing Test
In Youngberg v. Romeo, 105 the Court held that a severely

retarded person, involuntarily committed to a state institution,
had substantive rights to: "(1) safe conditions of confinement;
(2) freedom from bodily restraints; and (3) training or
'habilitation."' 106 Using a balancing test, the Court stated that
in "determining whether a substantive right protected under
the Due Process clause has been violated, it is necessary to
balance 'the liberty interest of the individual' and 'the demands
of an organized society."' 107
In determining what process sufficiently protects the liberty interests of an involuntarily committed person, the Court
held that "[t]he Constitution only requires that the court make
certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised. It is
not appropriate for the courts to specify which of the several
professionally acceptable choices should have been made." 108
The Court also held that the interests of an involuntarily committed person are entitled to protection under the due process
clause, stating that "there certainly is no reason to think judg-

103.
ld.
104.
ld. (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982)) (footnote omitted).
105.
457 U.S. 307 (1982).
106.
ld. at 309.
107.
ld. at 320 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
Youngberg v. Romeo at 321 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 644 F.2d 147,
108.
178 (3rd Cir. 1980), affd, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)).
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es or juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals
in making such decisions." 109
Taken at face value, the above reasoning seems to have
application in Cruzan. The Court, however, rejected
Youngberg's application to Cruzan because the facts in
Youngberg applied to a retarded adult's freedom from bodily
restraint and did not pertain to decisions to administer or withIt is difficult to understand why
hold medical treatment. 110
the Court would take this position because a surrogate decision-maker's choice to terminate life-sustaining treatment of an
incompetent person is based heavily on the "professional" opinion of competent medical doctors. 111 Perhaps directing states
to follow its reasoning in Youngberg would require states to
follow the substitute judgment theory, a theory which the
Court rejects throughout the Cruzan opinion. 112 It is likely,
however, that the court only wished to buttress its due process
analysis by showing that "right to die" decisions may properly
be subjected to procedural and substantive processes which
allow for a proper balancing of state and individual interests.
Despite the Court's rejection of Youngberg's application in
Cruzan, the analytical procedures set forth in Youngberg are a
valuable tool which may be exercised by state courts as parens
patriae for incompetent individuals in "right to die" cases.

V. Parens Patriae: EFFECT OF Cruzan ON STATE POWER
TO LEGISLATE AND OVERSEE AN INCOMPETENT INDIVIDUAL'S
"RIGHT TO DIE"
Mter Cruzan, states extending a right to die to their citizens based on a federal constitutional right to privacy113 must
reexamine the current status of this "right" and rely more
heavily on state constitutions, statutes, or judicial proceedings
implicitly and explicitly supported by the Cruzan Court.

109.
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. at 322-23. The Court further reasoned that
this standard of proof would not place undue burden on the states to justify use of
restraints or conditions of less than absolute safety. !d. at 322.
llO.
Cruzan, llO S. Ct. at 2857.
111.
See generally Linda F. Gould, Right to Die Le!{tslation: The Effect on
Physicians' Liability, 39 MERCER 1. REV. 517 (1988); Allen E. Buchanan, The
Limits of Proxy Decisionmaking for Incompetents, 29 UCLA L. REV. 386 (1981).
112.
See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. 2855-56.
ll3.
See supra text accompanying note 7.
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A. The Doctrine of Parens Patriae.
The doctrine of parens patriae was established in the
courts of England and adopted into the United States's legal
system 114 as courts found it necessary to exercise their inherent powers of equity. 115 The parens patriae power has also
been found to exist by reference to state constitutions. 116
Some courts have, however, refused to invoke the parens patriae doctrine in· the absence of an explicit statutory mandate to
do so. 117 Whether founded in inherent equitable powers, state
constitutions, or statutes, the doctrine of parens patriae forms a
solid basis upon which courts may help in mediating the polar
spectrum which now exists between a state's interest in
preservation of life and an incompetent individual's rights in
"right to die" cases.

B.

Cruzan's Approval of the Parens Patriae Doctrine

The majority in Cruzan did not explicitly rely on the doctrine of parens patriae in reaching its decision, yet, the dissent
argued heavily that the Court's majority opinion allowed an
over-expansive acceptance of the doctrine. 118 AI though the
Court examined the various methods a state may rely upon in
considering cases such as Cruzan, the Court recognized that it
could not rely on any of those means 119 and instead rested its
decision on a fourteenth amendment "liberty interest" analysis.120 Cruzan's fourteenth amendment analysis provides a
solid analytical framework upon which states may develop
procedural and substantive safeguards in "right to die" cases.
In rejecting some of the methods used by state courts to
decide this difficult issue, the Supreme Court has apparently
114.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
115.
See, e.g., Wentzel v. Montgomery General Hosp., 447 A.2d 1244, 1248 (Md.
1982).
116.
See id. at 1249 (citing Matter of Guardianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d 635
(Wash. 1980) (en bane)). See also N.Y. CoNST. art. XVII, § 1 ("The aid, care and
support of the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state and by
such of its subdivisions and in such manner and by such means, as the legislature
may from time to time determine.").
117.
See, e.g., Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub
nom. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2871 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
118.
!d. at 2851.
119.
120.
See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
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strengthened the ability of states to assert an interest in the
preservation of life while at the same time protecting an incompetent patient's desire to have life-sustaining treatment removed based on the doctrine of parens patriae. Cruzan appears
to lessen the restrictions on state action in "right to die" cases
by eliminating prior notions that the incompetent's right to die
is grounded in a constitutional right to privacy or in the common law rights of informed consent or substitute judgment.
Precedent was partially the reason that prior courts adhered to
doctrines established in common and federal constitutional
law. 121 Without the "penumbral" cloak122 of the federal constitutional right to privacy hindering their analysis, the courts
may exercise greater liberty in protecting the rights and interests of persons such as Nancy Cruzan 123 while at the same
time protecting appropriate state interests.
In the Cruzan case, the Court stated that Nancy Cruzan
was not afforded the same constitutional protection a competent person is afforded. 124 In such instances, a State's interest
seems to go beyond the traditional state interests usually asserted in "right to die" cases 125-interests which have created
a paradigm which courts have consistently relied upon in com-

121.
Most courts have relied on the Quinlan/Saikewicz dichotomy in deciding
"right to die" cases. Courts which have "wrestled" with such a difficult issue should
be granted due recognition. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 428 (Blackmar, J.,
dissenting).
See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
122.
123.
"[T]he more challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures for safeguarding incompetents' liberty interests is entrusted to the 'laboratory' of the
States . . . ." Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2859 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
124.
The Court stated:
Petitioners insist that under the general holdings of our cases, the
forced administration of life-sustaining medical treatment, and even of
artificially-delivered food and water essential to life, would implicate a
competent person's liberty interest. Although we think the logic of the
cases discussed above would embrace such a liberty interest, the dramatic
consequences involved in refusal of such treatment would inform the inquiry as to whether the deprivation of that interest is constitutionally
permissible. But for purposes of this case, we assume that the United
States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.
Id. at 2852 (emphasis added).
125.
These interests are: "(1) the preservation of life; (2) the protection of the interests of innocent third parties; (3) the prevention of suicide; and (4) maintaining
the ethical integrity of the medical profession." Superintendent of Belchertown
State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d. 417, 425 (Mass. 1977).
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mon law and federal constitutional "right to die" decisions.
Since the State of Missouri may not be required to defer to the
surrogate decision of Nancy's parents 126 and may also require
clear and convincing evidence 127 of her intent to have her life
prolonged, the state may invoke the doctrine of parens patriae
to protect both Nancy's and its own interests. Indeed, the state,
"acting in its role as parens patriae, has the right and the duty
to protect its weaker members" of society. 128

C. State Constitutional Right to Privacy in "Right to Die"
Cases
A state is not precluded from determining that its own
constitution provides an incompetent person with a right to
privacy in refusing life-sustaining treatment. This proposition
follows from the generally accepted notion that the United
States Constitution is only a minimum standard of protection
for citizen rights. 129 Accordingly, a state is free to offer its citizens protection above that provided by the United States Constitution.130 For example, the California Constitution explicit126.
The Court stated that "[a]ll of the reasons previously discussed for allowing
Missouri to require clear and convincing evidence of the patient's wishes lead us to
conclude that the state may choose to defer only to those wishes, rather than
confide the decision to close family members." Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2856.
The Court's discussion of the clear and convincing standard of evidence cen127.
tered on the idea that the standard reflected the "importance of a particular
adjudication" and served as "'a societal judgment about how the risk of error
should be distributed between the litigants.'" Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2854 (quoting
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)). Most importantly though, the Court
focused on the idea that:
An erroneous decision not to terminate [life] results in a maintenance of
the status quo; the possibility of subsequent developments such as advancements in medical science, the discovery of new evidence regarding
the patient's intent, changes in the law, or simply the unexpected death
of the patient despite the administration of life sustaining treatment, at
least create the potential that a wrong decision will eventually be corrected or its impact mitigated. An erroneous decision to withdraw lifesustaining treatment, however, is not susceptible of correction.
!d.
In re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d 1376, 1380 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); see also In re
128.
C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1981).
129.
Mills v. Rogers 457 U.S. 291 (1982). There, the Court stated that "(f1or
purposes of determining actual rights and obligations, however, questions of state
law cannot be avoided. Within our federal system the substantive rights provided
by the Federal Constitution define only a minimum. State law may recognize liberty interests more extensive than those independently protected by the Federal
Constitution." Id. at 300 (citations omitted).
See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection
130.
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ly provides for the right to privacy, stating that "[a]ll people are
by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights.
Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." 131 States are free,
therefore, to extend a state constitutional right to privacy to
their citizens. Florida has recently extended such a right by
constitutional amendment. 132 Further, the Florida Supreme
Court recently held that the Florida Constitution allows an
incompetent individual the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment based on a state constitutional right to privacy. 133
Seemingly, extending the state constitutional right of privacy is the preferred solution to protecting the rights of both
the incompetent individual and the state. 134 If such a right is
not created/ 35 however, it becomes the right of the state as
parens patriae to protect the rights of incompetent individuals
such as Nancy Cruzan. This conclusion stems from Cruzan's
apparent rejection of the notion that the common law doctrine
of informed consent may be applied in cases involving an incompetent person's right to refuse life-sustaining treat-

of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); Brennan, The Bill of Rights
and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual
Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986).
131.
CAL. CONS"!'. art. I, § 1; see also HAW. CoNST. art. 1, § 6 ("The right of the
people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed without the showing of a
compelling state interest. The legislature shall take affirmative steps to implement
this right.").
132.
See FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 23 (1991) ("Every natural person has the right to
be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life . . . .").
133.
In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990). Some courts,
however, have rejected the notion that an incompetent person has a state constitutional right to privacy in declining life-sustaining treatment. See, e.g., McKay
v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990).
Justice Scalia stated that the right to make such a public policy decision
134.
"is up to the citizens of . . . [the state] to decide through their elected representatives." Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2859 (Scalia, J., concurring). A state constitution may
be amended by state legislatures who, through the political process, are chosen by
citizens of the state. C{. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985).
135.
It may be argued that even in the existence of a state constitutional right
to privacy, a court must still exercise its parens patriae power to resolve disputes
which may arise concerning an incompetent person's previously purported desire to
refuse life-sustaining treatment. Such a contest should be guided by procedures
which reflect the seriousness of the ultimate outcome, in this instance usually a
showing of clear and convincing evidence.
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ment. 136
The wisdom of applying common law doctrines to cases
involving an incompetent person's right to die subsides in light
of Cruzan. 137 Additionally, present living will statutes do not
provide an adequate means of protecting the sometimes unascertainable wishes of an incompetent person's desire to receive
or refuse life-sustaining treatment. 138 In light of these circumstances, 139 it is questionable whether a state would be required to defer to a surrogate's decision to terminate an
incompetent's life-sustaining treatment when competent and
probative evidence establishes the incompetent's intent. 140
Therefore, the doctrine of parens patriae, as exercised by the
judicial branch, may be a better means of effectuating an
incompetent's right to die.

D. Courts and Guardians: Keepers of the State's Parens Patriae Power
Decisions to forego life-prolonging procedures may be held
m the hands of guardians 141 or the courts 142 as parens pa136.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852.
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
137.
138.
See supra notes 52-69 and accompanying text.
139.
In view of the apparent problems with common law doctrines and living
will statutes, an initial strong presumption in favor of a state's interest in promoting life may be properly asserted. Concerning such a presumption, the Court in
Cruzan stated:
In the context presented here, a State has more particular interests
at stake. The choice between life and death is a deeply personal decision
of obvious and overwhelming finality. We believe Missouri may legitimately seek to safeguard the personal element of this choice through the imposition of heightened evidentiary requirements.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852; see also infra notes 154 & 160 and accompanying text.
140.
The Cruzan Court explicitly reserved the question by stating:
We are not faced in this case with the question of whether a State
might be required to defer to the decision of a surrogate if competent and
probative evidence established that the patient herself had expressed a
desire that the decision to terminate life-sustaining treatment be made for
her by that individual.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2856 n.12. It will prove difficult to prove an incompetent
person's desire without the aid of formal procedures such as the "living will" since
most persons do not contemplate ever being in a position of incompetency. Sei id.
(citing 2 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 241-42 (1982)). Adequate procedural and substantive safeguards may better,
although not perfectly, aid in such situations.
141.
See, e.g., In re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d 1376, 1380 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)
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triae acting on behalf of the state. Indeed, the seminal case of
In re Quinlan, 143 upon which most subsequent cases have relied, held that .the judicial authority to order discontinuation of
life-sustaining treatment could be found in the parens patriae
power of the state. 144 The Court in Cruzan explicitly provided
that states may create procedural methods to deal with an
incompetent's right to die. 145 Accordingly, the state court may
act as parens patriae on behalf of the incompetent, reviewing
the facts of each individual case to assure that the rights of the
incompetent are protected. By analogy to petitions to sterilize
incompetent individuals, 146 a proper procedural framework
may be created by state legislatures or by state courts.
The Missouri Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Harmon stated
that "[a] guardian's power to exercise third party choice arises
from the state's authority, not the constitutional rights of the
ward. The guardian is the delegatee of the state's parens patriae power."147 Accordingly, guardians represent both the state
and the incompetent individual as parens patriae for the incompetent individual and as delegatee of the state's parens patriae
power.

("court-appointed 'guardian', . . . being an officer of the court, is always under the
court's control and is subject to its directions as to the person of the ward").
142.
See, e.g., In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712, 716-17 (Mass. 1982) ("prior judicial
approval is required before a guardian may consent to administering or withholding . . . extraordinary . . . treatment").
143.
70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
144.
See, e.g., Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980).
145.
The Cruzan Court stated that "a State is entitled to consider that a judicial
proceeding to make a determination regarding an incompetent's wishes may very
well not be an adversarial one, with the added guarantee of accurate factfinding
that the adversary process brings with it." Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2841. In this
sense, a judicial proceeding is much like an administrative proceeding. The doctrine
of parens patriae has been criticized on the basis that it affords little judicial
scrutiny of administrative decisions. See Peter M. Horstman, Protective Services for
the Elderly: The Limits of Parens Patriae, 40 Mo. L. REV. 215 (1975). Theoretically,
when a court is allowed to apply a clear and convincing standard of evidence in a
proceeding like that in Cruzan, the court is acting as parens patriae for the
individual. This is because the court is also seeking to act in the best interest of
the incompetent person, not the best interest of the state. Additionally, there are
adequate safeguards for administrative proceedings found in all state constitutions.
See, e.g., Stofer v. Motor Vehicle Casualty Co., 68 Ill. 2d 361, 369 N.E.2d. 875
(1977) (unconstitutional delegation of power).
See infra section V.D.l.
146.
147.
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 425 (citing In re Link, 713 S.W.2d 487,
493 (Mo. 1986) (en bane)).
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1. Procedural guidelines
The doctrine of parens patriae has traditionally been limited to protecting minors and incompetents 148 where they are
not normally afforded constitutional protection. 149 For purposes of analysis, this subsection will focus on decisions which
have allowed the use of the parens patriae doctrine in deciding
whether an incompetent individual may be sterilized based on
the requests of guardians. This note argues that the same principles relied upon in those cases may be properly applied in
cases such as Cruzan.
The doctrine of parens patriae has often been applied to
cases where a guardian has petitioned for the sterilization of
an incompetent ward150 and where a state has had an interest in promoting and preserving the welfare of the incompetent
person. 151 Likewise, it may be argued that a state has an interest, as parens patriae, in promoting the rights of incompetent
individuals in "right to die" cases. In In re C.D.M., 152 a sterilization request case, the Alaska Supreme Court established
procedural guidelines which could, by analogy, provide the
context upon which a state may further its own interests and
those of the incompetent individual in "right to die" cases.
In re C.D.M. involved a case where the parents of a nineteen-year-old mildly retarded child suffering from Down's Syndrome requested that their child be sterilized. The Alaska Supreme Court held that under its parens patriae authority,

148.
The parens patriae doctrine has, however, recently been extended to allow
"any attorney general of a state" to seek redress for antitrust violations "on behalf
of natural citizens residing" in the state. Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 110 S.
Ct. 2807, 1818 (1990). Accordingly, a state, as parens patriae, has a right to sue to
prevent harm to its "quasi-sovereign" interests. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil
Co., 405 U.S. 251, 258 (1972).
See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); John A. Siliciano,
149.
Note, The Minor's Right of Privacy: Limitations on State Action After Danforth and
Carey, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1216, 1218 (1977).
See, e.g., In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 820-21 (Colo. 1990) ("No Colorado
150.
statute authorizes district courts to act on petitions for sterilizations ... , however, . . . district courts have jurisdiction to act on petitions for sterilization of incompetent persons under the courts' parens patriae authority."); In re Moe, 432
N.E.2d 712 (Mass. 1982); In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467 (N.J. 1981); In re Guardianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d 635 (Wash. 1980).
See, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981);
151.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972).
152.
627 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1981).
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courts had jurisdiction to deal with such petitions. 153 Additionally, the court set forth the following minimum standards
which state courts must follow in granting petitions for sterilization:
(1) Those advocating sterilization bear the heavy burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence that sterilization is
in the best interests of the incompetent;
(2) The incompetent must be afforded a full judicial hearing
at which medical testimony is presented and the incompetent
through a guardian ad litem, is allowed to present proof and
cross examine witnesses;
(3) The trial judge must be assured that a comprehensive
medical, psychological, and social evaluation is made of the
incompetent;
(4) The trial court must determine that the individual is legally incompetent to make a decision whether to be sterilized
and that this incapacity is in all likelihood permanent;

(8) The court must examine the motivation behind the petition.154

This list of procedural safeguards can, by analogy, be applied to
cases such as Cruzan, a case involving something which is
arguably much more serious than the right of procreation.
In several cases concerning the sterilization of incompetent
individuals, the courts have been extremely cautious in allowing guardians to exercise their power to have incompetent
individuals sterilized. 155 If such a protection may be legitimately exercised by the courts as parens patriae for an incompetent
person, it makes no sense not to extend that court protection to
cases where a guardian seeks to terminate the life of an incompetent individual.

153.
!d. at 612.
154.
!d. at 612-13.
155.
See, e.g., In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 822 (Colo. 1990) ("Because the
seriousness of the rights and interests at stake and the irreversibility of sterilization, courts must exercise great care and caution in evaluating petitions for nonconsensual sterilization."); In re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d 1376, 1382 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1982) ("We caution that because sterilization necessarily results in the permanent
termination of the intensely personal right of procreation, the trial judge must take
the greatest care to ensure that the incompetent's rights are jealously guarded.")
(emphasis in original).
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2. Substantive guidelines
Although the Court in Cruzan provided that a state may
assert an "unqualified interest" in life, 156 this statement only
allows a state to avoid the "abrogation of the state's parens
patriae power" 157 in favor of the substitute judgment theory,
which "authorizes a guardian to cause the death of a ward unilaterally, without interference by the state, and contrary to the
state's vital interests in preserving life and in assuring the
safekeeping of those who cannot care for themselves." 158
When faced with the actual decision of whether to allow a
guardian to permit removal of life-sustaining treatment, a
court must use substantive guidelines to reach such a decision.
An example of these guidelines was set forth in In re Beth
Israel Medical Center. 159 In Beth Israel, the court began its
analysis, stating:
Since an incompetent patient cannot choose for himself,
the presumption should initially be that he would choose life
and favor any procedure which sustains, prolongs or enhances
life, and this presumption should prevail unless it be established by clear and convincing evidence that the burdens of
continued life for this patient markedly outweigh the benefits
that furthering life would bring. "Clear and convincing'' proof
is a more appropriate standard than "preponderance of evidence" to determine the patient's ''best interests", when the
decision will so directly affect the length of time the patient
will continue to live. Secondly, no procedure should be withheld if to do so would conflict with any prior contrary wishes
of the patient, or would be inconsistent with his character or
beliefs. Further, no life-shortening course of action should be
contemplated unless the patient is, at the very least, suffering
from severe and permanent mental and physical debilitation
and with a very limited natural life expectancy. 160

The court then set forth its substantive criteria to determine
when burdens outweigh the benefits of continuing life-sustaining treatment. The factors include:

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2853.
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 426.
ld. (emphasis added).
519 N.Y.S.2d 511 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
ld. at 516.
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1. the age of the patient
2. the life expectancy with or without the procedure
contemplated
3. the degree of present and future pain or suffering with or
without the procedure
4. the extent of the patient's physical and mental disability
and degree of helplessness
5. statements, if any, made by the patient which directly or
impliedly manifest his views on life prolonging measures
6. the quality of patient's life with or without the procedure,
i.e., the extent, if any, of pleasure, emotional enjoyment or
intellectual satisfaction that the patient will obtain from prolonged life
7. the risks to life from the procedure contemplated as well as
its adverse side affects and degree of invasiveness
8. religious or ethical beliefs of the patient
9. views of those close to him
10. views of the physician
11. the type of care which will be required if life is prolonged
as contrasted with what will be actually available to him
12. whether there are any overriding State parens patriae
interests in sustaining life (e.g. preventing suicide, integrity
of the medical profession or protection of innocent third parties, such as children) 161

Although these guidelines are not intended to be all inclusive,
they do form a good substantive basis upon which the court, as
parens patriae, may protect the right of an incompetent
individual's right to die.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Cruzan has correctly sought to
strike a balance between a state's interest in preserving life
and protecting an incompetent individual's right to die by allowing states to act as parens patriae for an incompetent individual. In reaching this balance, the Court has apparently
rejected the common law doctrines of informed consent and
substitute judgment as applied to an incompetent's right to die.
The Court was correct in allowing the states to invoke its parens patriae power in asserting an interest in an incompetent's
right to die because it prevents unilateral decision-making by
161.

ld. at 516-17.
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individuals who may not be acting in the best interest of the
individual.
Additionally, many living will statutes do not comport with
Cruzan because they allow for unilateral substitute decisionmaking without affording a state's interest proper weight. The
Cruzan decision also rejects the notion that a federal right of
privacy is available in "right to die" cases. As such, the states
are now free to legislate on the issue without fear of overstepping the constitutional bounds of the federal right of privacy.
Moreover, states may turn to their own constitutions in finding
a state constitutional right to privacy.
Most importantly, the Court made an unprecedented move
in applying a fourteenth amendment "liberty interest" analysis
to an incompetent's right to die. This analysis allows states to
develop procedural processes which can serve to properly balance both the state's and the incompetent individual's interests
in "right to die" cases. Recognizing both interests, the Court
has implicitly extended the doctrine of parens patriae to these
cases.
The doctrine of parens patriae forms a solid base upon
which states may invoke procedural processes which are explicitly supported in Cruzan, procedures which will properly balance state and individual interests. Additionally, guardians act
as delegatees of the state's parens patriae power and should
therefore be subjected to the court's guidance in reaching a
decision of such magnitude as found in Cruzan.
Finally, the Cruzan decision does not give the state an
unfettered right to intrude into the personal decision of an
incompetent's right to die. It only provides that a state may
initially assert an "unqualified interest" in the preservation of
life counterbalancing the previously unchallenged right of a
guardian to substitute his judgment on behalf of the individual.
Once the state has asserted its interest, it must then seek to
protect the interest of the incompetent individual. This may be
done through the courts and guardians as parens patriae for
the incompetent individual. Therefore, the court must use substantive guidelines to reach appropriate decisions which will
ultimately further the interest of the incompetent individual's
purported desire to receive or withhold life-sustaining treatment.
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